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I. How Compulsory Licensing Survived the 
TRIPS Agreement of 1994
Few topics in international intellectual property law 
have been as controversial in recent years as the one 
we are about to examine. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
a Diplomatic Conference attempted to revise the old-
est international convention providing some protec-
tion for patented inventions outside of the domes-
tic laws.1 Those efforts broke down, largely because 
developed and developing countries could not agree 
on the powers that governments should retain to issue 
compulsory licenses or on the grounds for which these 
powers could be exercised.2 The failure of this Con-
ference, held under the auspices of the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), persuaded the 
technology-exporting countries to link future nego-
tiations concerning international intellectual prop-
erty protection to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
known as the Uruguay Round, which got underway 
in 1986.3 The end result was Annex IC of the Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization 
of 1994, which incorporated a new, comprehensive 
and relatively elevated set of international minimum 
standards of patent protection into the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement).4
A. What the TRIPS Agreement Did Not Give the 
Pharmaceutical Sector
Taken together, the TRIPS Agreement’s standards 
amounted to a veritable revolution in international 
intellectual property law from which the research-
based pharmaceutical industry emerged as one of the 
biggest winners. Faced with a “take it or leave it deci-
sion,” all developing-country Members of the WTO, 
including those with growing pharmaceutical produc-
tion capabilities, such as India, Brazil, and eventually 
China, agreed to respect relatively stringent world-
wide norms of patent protection no later than 2005.5 
In return, these countries were given greater access 
to developed markets for traditional manufactured 
goods plus a commitment of the developed countries 
to stop imposing unilateral trade sanctions for alleg-
edly inadequate protection of foreign intellectual 
property rights (IPRs).6
Ironically, if the developing countries lost the war, 
in the sense that their generic pharmaceutical indus-
tries could no longer freely reverse-engineer the costly 
products of foreign research and development under 
the shield of domestic laws that ignored pharmaceuti-
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cal patents, then they won a great battle with speciﬁc 
regard to the question of compulsory licenses,7 which 
had triggered the drive for the TRIPS Agreement in 
the ﬁrst place. Thanks largely to the fortitude and 
analytical skills of the Indian delegation,8 the right of 
governments to grant compulsory licenses on virtually 
any ground — including public interest, abuse or anti-
competitive conduct, or for noncommercial govern-
ment use, among others — issued stronger and clearer 
from the TRIPS Agreement than had previously been 
the case under the Paris Convention.9 
The TRIPS Agreement did subject the exercise of 
this power to certain preconditions, including a duty to 
notify and negotiate with the affected patentees under 
ordinary circumstances; but these speciﬁc conditions, 
among others, are waived in the case of “national 
emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public 
noncommercial [i.e., government] use.”10 
Moreover, the very existence of these 
conditions only magniﬁed the legitimacy 
of every complying government’s right to 
resort to compulsory licensing whenever 
its domestic self-interest so required.11
Historians may wish to note that, 
while international minimum standards 
of patent protection have gradually and 
progressively risen over time, in keep-
ing with the expressed goals of the Paris Union,12 
every attempt to limit or constrain a state’s power to 
issue compulsory licenses has invariably resulted in a 
strengthening of that same power at the international 
level.13 Policymakers and scholars should also note 
that two European Union (E.U.) countries, France and 
Belgium, recently adopted new and sweeping powers 
to grant compulsory licenses of patented pharmaceu-
tical inventions for public health purposes.14
1. the doha ministerial declaration on  
trips and public health
The developing countries’ victory in this regard — 
modest as it otherwise seems in the overall context 
of burdensome TRIPS obligations — was destined to 
bear even greater fruits with speciﬁc regard to phar-
maceuticals. The worldwide patent standards adopted 
by the TRIPS Agreement threatened to disrupt future 
supplies of patented medicines at prices people in poor 
countries could afford by elevating the prices patentees 
would charge affluent patients in these countries.15 
In principle, developing country governments need-
ing drugs at prices lower than those of the patentees 
could issue compulsory licenses under article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In reality, most of these countries 
lacked the capacity to manufacture the drugs in ques-
tion, or otherwise to obtain the key active ingredients, 
in which case the granting of a compulsory license 
could amount to an empty gesture for lack of access to 
non-infringing generic substitutes. 
Of course, Good Samaritan countries that possessed 
manufacturing capacity might be willing to assist a 
needy country by issuing compulsory licenses of their 
own, with a view to exporting supplies of the drug in 
question for this purpose. But that type of assistance 
was limited by article 31(f ) of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which expressly required products manufactured 
under a compulsory license to serve “predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market” (thus limiting 
such exports literally to 49.9 per cent of the total out-
put). Moreover, even middle-income countries with 
growing manufacturing capacity, such as India and 
Brazil, might themselves need a drug that they could 
not manufacture locally, in order to temper a paten-
tee’s prices. In that case, any willing supplier to them 
— if one could be found in a developed country — 
would likewise be bound by the limitation on exports 
that article 31(f ) imposed.
The tensions generated by these prospects for ris-
ing prices of essential medicines came to a head in 
the late 1990s, at the very time when the developed 
countries wanted the developing countries to agree to 
yet another round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
to be known as the Doha Round. The latter countries 
made removal of constraints on their public health 
authorities under the TRIPS Agreement a sine qua 
non of their participation in that Round. The outcome 
was a momentous Ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001, which, 
in paragraph 4, affirmed that this Agreement “can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members’ rights to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medi-
cines for all.” 16
The Ministerial Declaration expressly reconﬁrmed 
many of the key flexibilities set out in the TRIPS 
Agreement,17 including the power of WTO Members 
“to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
  
Taken together, the TRIPS Agreement’s 
standards amounted to a veritable revolution 
in international intellectual property law from 
which the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry emerged as one of the biggest winners.
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determine the grounds upon which such licenses are 
granted,”18 a freedom that the originator pharmaceuti-
cal companies had continued to question despite the 
clarity of the TRIPS language itself. The Declaration 
then expressly addressed the constraints on exports 
set out in article 31(f ) of TRIPS. In paragraph 6, it 
provided a mandate for “establishing legal machin-
ery to enable countries lacking the capacity to manu-
facture generic substitutes for costly patented medi-
cines under domestically issued compulsory licenses 
to obtain imports from countries able and willing to 
assist them without interference from the relevant 
patent holders.”19
2. the waiver to, and pending amendment of, 
article 31
This solution, which obviously improved the export 
opportunities for generic producers in Brazil, China, 
India, and other emerging economies, was to be 
broadly applied to all “products of the pharmaceutical 
sector needed to address the public health problems as 
recognized in paragraph 1 of [the Ministerial Declara-
tion].”20 There were no limitations in that paragraph 
on the application of the new legal machinery either 
to cases of national emergency or to speciﬁc diseases 
or medicines.21 This machinery would thus enable any 
country (that had not voluntarily waived the privilege) 
to issue a compulsory license for a medicine it could 
not produce and then to seek help from any other 
country having that capacity that was willing to assist 
it. If the latter country issued a second compulsory 
license, and otherwise complied with speciﬁed condi-
tions of registration and packaging, it could produce 
the requested medicines entirely for export and sup-
ply the needy country, notwithstanding the language 
of article 31(f ) of the TRIPS Agreement to the con-
trary.22 While “adequate compensation” must be paid 
to the patentee,23 it will be collected once only, in the 
exporting country, based on conditions in the import-
ing country.24
In other words, the scheme ultimately negotiated 
under the auspices of paragraph 6 of the Doha Min-
isterial Declaration envisioned a process of back-
to-back compulsory licenses that would enable any 
country needing medicines at lower prices than those 
charged by local patentees to seek assistance from 
other countries able and willing to produce the drugs 
for export purposes, without interference from the 
patentee in either country. After protracted and dif-
ﬁcult negotiations, this solution was initially embod-
ied in a Waiver, known as the Decision of 30 August 
2003.25 If all goes as planned, this Waiver would be 
rendered permanent by virtue of a pending Amend-
ment to the TRIPS Agreement, known as article 
31bis.26 The Waiver remains in effect while govern-
ments take steps to ratify the Amendment,27 as the 
European Union recently did after the European 
Parliament endorsed the Amendment and issued 
instructions for its wholehearted implementation.28 
As of 2009, the Waiver process had only been used 
once due in part to the cumbersome procedures put 
in place by some governments, in addition to the core 
WTO process.29
Meanwhile, the originator pharmaceutical industry 
did not accept this further defeat without countervail-
ing initiatives of its own. Besides ﬂooding the world 
with misleading and self-serving interpretations of 
the relevant legal instruments, which continue to 
inﬂuence incautious government officials and even 
some scholars to this day, the industry persuaded the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to recap-
ture some of the lost ground by means of Bilateral 
or Regional Free Trade Agreements with developing 
countries. While this topic lies well beyond the scope 
of this Comment, readers should be aware that the 
ﬂexibilities concerning governmental powers to grant 
compulsory licenses of patented pharmaceutical med-
icines under the legal regime described above could 
be severely limited, or even largely abrogated, by the 
one-sided intellectual property provisions of speciﬁc 
FTAs.30 Moreover, threats and political pressure from 
USTR and other governmental agencies, including 
some spokesmen for intergovernmental agencies and 
even for the European Commission, effectively kept 
most governments — until recently — from actually 
invoking or using the legal rights they had doggedly 
managed to obtain at the international level.
There was, in short, a conspicuous absence of com-
pulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical sector even 
after the decision of the South African authorities, in 
2003, to the effect that two foreign ﬁrms had violated 
the domestic competition law by refusing to grant 
licenses for patents on essential AIDS medicines.31 
While this decision did result in the issuing of compul-
sory licenses (within the ambit of TRIPS Agreement 
article 31(k)), the heated legal battles and controversy 
surrounding this case, plus renewed pressures from 
powerful governments, may actually have diminished, 
rather than strengthened the developing countries’ 
appetites for attracting unwelcome attention by such 
means. This pressure was intensiﬁed by mushrooming 
FTAs that aimed to circumscribe their rights under 
TRIPS.
B. The Legal Giant Escapes Its Chains
Beneath the surface, however, health ministries in a 
number of countries had quietly begun to use the threat 
of compulsory licenses to rein in the prices of selected 
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medicines, particularly AIDS drugs.32 Because negoti-
ated deals under threat of compulsory license are often 
kept secret, the surface calm appeared greater than it 
really was. Beginning in 2006, this calm was shattered 
by the sudden appearance of compulsory licenses on 
pharmaceuticals — or public threats thereof — in 
both the southern and northern hemispheres. In the 
period 2006-2007, for example, Thailand’s public 
health authorities issued two compulsory licenses on 
AIDS drugs and one on clopidogrel bisulfate (Plavix), 
a major cardiovascular treatment. Thailand did not 
issue the licenses discreetly, but with considerable 
fanfare and with a list of other drugs slated for similar 
treatment in the future.33 In April 2007, the president 
of Brazil signed an order for a compulsory license for 
government use of Merck’s patent on the antiretrovi-
ral drug, efavirenz (Sustiva), in a public ceremony that 
was broadcast around the world.34 
All these licenses were issued under the authority of 
existing TRIPS provisions, i.e., article 31 as it stands,35 
without regard to the Waiver. In 2007, Rwanda issued 
a compulsory license for AIDS drugs that it could 
not produce locally and applied for assistance from 
Canada, thus triggering the ﬁrst set of back-to-back 
compulsory licenses under the Waiver provisions that 
had implemented Paragraph 6 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.36 In 2008, Indonesia threatened origi-
nator pharmaceutical companies with compulsory 
licensing and even expulsion unless they were willing 
to invest in local production of pharmaceuticals.37
Other compulsory licensing procedures that led to 
agreements with major pharmaceutical companies 
had reportedly been initiated in Malaysia (2004), 
Indonesia (2004), Brazil (2003 and 2007), Zam-
bia (2004), Zimbabwe (2004), and Mozambique 
(2004).38 Moreover, compulsory licenses were threat-
ened against Roche for the use of oseltamivir (Tami-
ﬂu) in Indonesia, India, Vietnam, and South Korea, 
in the period 2003-2006. As a result, Roche selected 
partners in those countries to assist in the manufac-
ture of sufficient supplies of Tamiﬂu to combat Asian 
inﬂuenza.39
Even the United States threatened Bayer with a 
compulsory license on ciproﬂoxacin (Cipro) in 2001, 
which the U.S. intended to stockpile as a defense 
against anthrax.40 Bayer drastically lowered its price 
in response.
In the European Union, meanwhile, the French gov-
ernment extended an already potent system of ex-offi-
cio compulsory licensing for public health reasons to 
cover genetic diagnostic patents in 2004, in response 
to concerns about excessive prices and restrictive 
licensing conditions on patented diagnostic tests for 
breast and ovarian cancer.41 In 2005, the Belgian gov-
ernment adopted even broader new measures allow-
ing the authorities to grant compulsory licenses in the 
interest of public health generally, with accelerated 
procedures in case of a public health crisis.42 
These bold provisions in Belgium are even more 
remarkable because they do not purport to derive their 
authority from article 31 of TRIPS. Belgian officials 
claim their actions are justiﬁed under articles 8 and 
30 of the TRIPS Agreement, which respectively allow 
“measures necessary to protect public health” and lim-
ited exceptions to the patentee’s exclusive rights under 
article 28.43 In effect, the Belgian provision attempts 
to sidestep the conditions set out in article 31. While 
neither the French nor the Belgian authorities have 
so far issued compulsory licenses under these provi-
sions, “[l]awyers and patent attorneys argue…that the 
presence of these mechanisms brings pressure to bear 
upon non-cooperative patent holders and serves as a 
convincing argument to settle and drag them into a 
licensing agreement.”44
On still another front, the Italian Competition Law 
authorities issued compulsory licenses against Merck, 
on certain antibiotics, for abuse of a dominant position 
in 2005; against Glaxo, for refusal to license a patented 
migraine headache drug in 2006; and against Merck 
again for a refusal to license a treatment for baldness 
in 2008.45 Also in 2008, the European Commission 
began a sweeping investigation of pharmaceutical 
company practices46 which, if found anticompetitive, 
could lead to additional compulsory licenses.
In short, the pre-existing period of calm has given 
rise to a proliferation of compulsory licenses in various 
parts of the world, which in turn has generated heated 
controversy in both legal and public health circles. It 
Beneath the surface, however, health ministries in a number of countries  
had quietly begun to use the threat of compulsory licenses to rein in the  
prices of selected medicines, particularly AIDS drugs.
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is against this background that we must evaluate the 
contributions to this Symposium.
II. Contemplating the Giant’s Footprints  
in the Sand
This Symposium, guest edited by Professor Kevin 
Outterson, a leading authority on international pub-
lic health law, brings together three papers espousing 
rather different views of the compulsory licensing phe-
nomenon. For the sake of convenience, we may char-
acterize them respectively as providing “A Realistic 
View,” “A Sympathetic Skeptic’s View,” and a “Hostile 
Sympathizer’s View.” I propose to examine them sepa-
rately, but within the larger context sketched above. 
A. The Realists’ Perspective
Most economists would agree that, in a perfect world, 
originator pharmaceutical companies would avoid 
the risk of compulsory licensing by pricing their 
products so close to the marginal cost of produc-
tion that poor people around the world could afford 
to buy them.47 Assuming that ways could be found 
to keep products sold at low prices to poor countries 
from being re-exported as parallel imports to rich 
countries, the originator suppliers could, in theory, 
price-discriminate their products on the basis of per 
capita GDP. They would thus obtain a large volume 
of sales at low proﬁt margins in the poorest coun-
tries, offset by higher priced sales in middle income 
countries, and purely monopoly priced revenues in 
countries that decline to institute price controls, such 
as Medicare and private insurance markets in the 
United States. 
Price discrimination would, in turn, reduce the 
deadweight loss — that is, losses that occur when con-
sumers who would buy the products cannot afford to 
do so — without causing the originator companies to 
sell below cost. Assuming that the originator company 
expects to recoup its R&D costs and make the bulk of 
its proﬁts in rich OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries,48 selling 
the same products to large numbers of poor people 
at very low prices (but still above the marginal cost of 
production) should nonetheless yield proﬁts at least 
comparable to those of generic producers, who are not 
charitable institutions and who proﬁtably market off-
patent medicines in poor countries. Economist F. M. 
Scherer made this point clearly when he established 
that global welfare would be improved if the poorest 
countries were permitted to free ride on pharmaceuti-
cal innovation.49
So why do the pharmaceutical companies — with 
possibly one recent but clamorous exception50 — 
decline to escape the heat by overtly adopting an 
optimal price discrimination strategy (coupled with 
binding agreements to limit parallel exports, which 
otherwise remain perfectly legal under article 6 of the 
TRIPS Agreement51)? One authoritative answer, pro-
vided by Patricia Danzon and Adrian Towse, is that 
the originator companies are wary of so-called “refer-
ence pricing” in rich OECD countries that maintain 
price control regimes for pharmaceuticals.52 If the 
originator company proﬁtably sold its drug in Ruri-
tania for a penny a pill, regulators in Occitania might 
balk at allowing it to charge ﬁfty or a hundred dol-
lars for the same pill, even if those regulators under-
stood perfectly that the company must recoup the 
often cited (but still controversial) billion dollar cost 
of R&D that each new FDA-approved molecule alleg-
edly incurs.53 Hence, Danzon and Towse propose a 
system of secret rebates that might promote greater 
price discrimination by limiting the foreign regula-
tors’ ability to discover the prices actually charged 
to distributors in poor countries for use as reference 
prices in rich countries.54 One of Danzon’s colleagues 
recently proposed a similar scheme of pricing opacity 
and secret discounts for the global vaccine procure-
ment system.55 
1. the convex demand curve problem
While this thesis undoubtedly identiﬁes one relevant 
factor, the contribution to this Symposium by Sean 
Flynn, Aidan Hollis, and Mike Palmedo56 provides a 
more compelling explanation for originator compa-
nies’ resistance to price discrimination in poor coun-
tries. Indeed, we should be grateful that, by publish-
ing this article, the Journal will bring Aidan Hollis’ 
Most economists would agree that, in a perfect world, originator 
pharmaceutical companies would avoid the risk of compulsory licensing  
by pricing their products so close to the marginal cost of production that  
poor people around the world could afford to buy them.
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brilliant economic analysis, long circulating among 
NGOs, to the attention of a wider audience.
Hollis shows that, in very poor countries character-
ized by great disparities of income, the rational-acting 
originator company seeking to maximize proﬁts will 
logically charge high prices to the affluent sector of 
the society, because it will earn much greater proﬁts 
than if it had distributed the same drug to poverty 
stricken masses at prices they could afford. Calling 
this the problem of “highly convex demand curves”57 
for essential goods in countries with large disparities 
of income, Hollis shows, for example, that the ratio-
nal-acting ﬁrm operating in South Africa would maxi-
mize proﬁts “by selling at the price that only the top 
10% can afford.”58 In effect, “the ﬁrm will maximize its 
proﬁts by setting a price unaffordable for at least 90% 
of …[the] people.”59 That ﬁnding translates to a dead-
weight loss of 90 percent, in a pharmaceutical sector 
where, as James Love famously observed, deadweight 
loss tends over time to become dead bodies.
Hollis contrasts his ﬁgures on South Africa with 
conditions in Norway, where there is a high degree 
of income equality and the “convex demand curve” 
problem largely disappears. He demonstrates that a 
rational-acting originator company that price dis-
criminated a patented medicine in Norway would 
accordingly make much greater proﬁts than one who 
charged a high ﬂat rate for a privileged few.60 The for-
mer company will considerably reduce deadweight 
loss as well, in its own self-interest.
Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo thus answer the ques-
tion that mystiﬁes so many newcomers to this ﬁeld: 
originator companies avoid price discrimination in 
poor countries because it is considerably more prof-
itable for them to charge monopoly prices to affluent 
citizens, as their patents enable them to do. The gov-
ernment of a poor country that wants lower prices in 
order to supply the bulk of the population thus priced 
out of the market must accordingly force the company 
to act against its private self-interest in the larger 
interests of public health. And the most powerful tool 
for achieving this end remains that of a threat by the 
state to impose a compulsory license. As the Thai Gov-
ernment explained in a White Paper, for example, the 
goal behind its recent barrage of compulsory licenses 
was to move the relevant pharmaceutical companies 
from a “low volume-high margin” pricing strategy to a 
“high volume-low margin” alternative approach.61
A complementary strategy might focus on building 
price discrimination tools into the developing coun-
tries’ pharmaceutical distribution systems, with a view 
to enabling more rational policies. Most commenta-
tors neglect this question, but if the U.S. can maintain 
many levels of pharmaceutical price discrimination, 
perhaps developing countries could achieve two or 
three.62 In Mexico, for example, Professor Outterson 
suggests that three distinct markets could be seg-
mented: the elite private insurance markets, the Segu-
ridad Social system for those working in the formal 
economy, and the public health system for the remain-
ing citizens.63
2. using compulsory licenses to remedy  
the problem
Governments adopting the compulsory licensing 
strategy must exercise caution in choosing the legal 
instruments best suited to accomplishing their goals, 
in order to withstand both the political and economic 
pressures they are certain to elicit and to emerge 
unscathed from any legal action ﬁled against them 
at the WTO. Here Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo cast a 
yearning glance back to the days before 1992, when 
Canadian law imposed a “license of right” on all pat-
ented pharmaceutical products marketed in that coun-
try.64 Any would-be generic distributor could apply 
for such a license and, if granted, could produce and 
market the patented medicine at competitive prices, 
in return for a four percent royalty that the Commis-
sioner of Patents typically imposed.65
The Canadian license of right, which lasted for 
more than 50 years, undoubtedly helped to establish 
that country’s robust generic industry, although crit-
ics contend that it discouraged the establishment of 
a research-based pharmaceutical sector at the same 
time. Both the generic industry and any research-
based companies must, of course, operate in the 
shadow of larger U.S. competitors, and under the reg-
ulatory constraints of national and provincial public 
health programs. 
In the early 1990s, the Reagan Administration 
pressed the Canadian government to abandon its 
license of right scheme, in exchange for a commit-
ment by U.S. producers to contribute a share of their 
proﬁts to support medical research in Canada.66 The 
Canadian compulsory licensing approach was then 
formally prohibited by the intellectual property chap-
ter in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), whose provisions, in turn, became a blue-
print for article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 67
Under the latter provision, a WTO Member govern-
ment cannot subject whole classes of pharmaceuticals 
— such as “essential medicines” — to a pre-established 
compulsory licensing scheme. It must, instead, adopt 
a case-by-case approach and shape the compulsory 
license to meet the purpose for which each license 
was authorized.68 Under ordinary circumstances, the 
license would issue only after a failed negotiation with 
the rights holder,69 and — at least in principle — could 
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be terminated “if and when the circumstances which 
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”70 
Any decision to grant such a license must be subject 
to judicial review (or comparable review by another 
higher authority),71 and “adequate remuneration in 
the circumstances of each case” must be paid.72
Given these legal obstacles to a pure “open access” 
scheme, Flynn et al. stress the importance of competi-
tion law as a viable alternative in many cases.73 While 
an action sounding in anticompetitive conduct under 
article 31(k) will require some judicial or administra-
tive process,74 a ﬁnding of such conduct exempts the 
government from any need to negotiate with the pat-
ent holder, and even from the obligation to conﬁne 
a compulsory license predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market.75 The amount of remunera-
tion may also become negligible in such cases, given 
the punitive aspects of remedying anticompetitive 
behavior.76
However, our authors make resorting to competi-
tion law sound much easier than it has so far proved 
to be for most developing countries. Competition law, 
as practiced in developed countries, entails complex 
economic analysis, high transaction costs, and skilled 
regulators.77 Moreover, the E.U. practice, built around 
measures to prevent abuse of a dominant position, 
varies considerably from the much less aggressive 
stance of the U.S. authorities,78 which looks for evi-
dence of actual monopolization or intent to achieve 
it.79 Both regimes depend on a complex showing of 
market power, although long-standing (but increas-
ingly disfavored) common law precedents sounding in 
patent law still allow U.S. courts to impose compul-
sory licenses for “misuse of patents” in the absence of 
market power.80
Besides these technical intricacies, there are high-
level policy decisions that must be made about the 
goals of competition law in general, i.e., efficiency 
or fairness, or some combination of both,81 and then 
about the proper relationship to be struck between 
that version of competition law and the incentives to 
innovate that ﬂow from the exclusive rights of intel-
lectual property law.82 Increasingly, competition law 
in developed countries is seen, rightly or wrongly, as 
providing a supportive and complementary role of 
promoting welfare — one that is consistent with the 
goals of intellectual property law, rather than a seri-
ous restraint upon it.83 This view makes doctrines 
that override intellectual property rights, such as the 
“essential facility” doctrine recommended by Flynn 
et al.,84 much harder to obtain in practice than may 
appear in theory.85
Developing countries have lagged behind in the ﬁeld 
of competition law, and some, such as China, are just 
beginning to explore its possibilities. These countries 
would be well advised to track early U.S. cases, empha-
sizing fairness over efficiency;86 and to adopt both the 
“abuse of a dominant position” theory of E.U. law and a 
ﬂexible doctrine of “patent misuse” historically rooted 
in U.S. patent law, which could reach refusals to deal, 
excessive prices, and undersupply of the market, with-
out a showing of market power.87 But such measures 
must be applied equally to domestic ﬁrms as to foreign 
ﬁrms,88 without discrimination, and therein lies a seri-
ous rub.
While competition law can provide useful tools in 
appropriate cases, developing countries envisioning 
a need for compulsory licensing of patented pharma-
ceuticals should look to other tools not explored by our 
authors that lie outside competition law. One is the 
Waiver (and, eventually, Amendment scheme under 
pending article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement), which 
enables developing countries without manufactur-
ing capacity to implement compulsory licenses with 
the aid of countries that do possess such capacity, a 
topic already mentioned above.89 A second tool worth 
exploring is the Belgian model also identiﬁed above, 
which facilitates compulsory licensing in the interest 
of public health under articles 8 and 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, rather than article 31 as such. While the 
legality of this route has yet to be tested by WTO tri-
bunals,90 the modalities it offers arguably remain con-
sistent with TRIPS, so long as the preconditions of 
article 31 are largely observed in practice.
B. A Sympathetic Skeptic
In his contribution,91 Professor Robert Bird sympa-
thizes with the more than 1.7 billion people who have 
little or no access to essential medicines.92 He recog-
nizes that, by their growing reliance on compulsory 
licensing, developing countries have begun to lower 
prices below those the patent owner would otherwise 
charge, thereby “potentially saving millions of lives and 
improving the public health of dozens of nations.”93 His 
skepticism stems from concerns that the social costs 
of such licenses — what he calls “secondary effects” – 
may “negate any beneﬁts from increased access.”94 
Chief among the social costs warranting such con-
cern are:
??? ????????? ? ???????? ??????????????????????????????
that resort to compulsory licensing because patent 
owners will seek out more business-friendly legal 
environments;
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
will “shadow price” the patentees and thus gen-
erate deadweight loss of their own in pursuit of 
proﬁts;
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research-driven pharmaceutical sector’s incen-
tives to innovate; and
??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ate with trade sanctions that could “cripple the 
economy of the licensing nation.”95
The bulk of Professor Bird’s article then proposes a 
number of strategies for improving consumer access 
to medicines at lower social costs, without necessar-
ily relying on the generosity of donors.96 To this end, 
he espouses ﬁve strategies to alleviate the social costs 
of compulsory licensing in developing countries, 
namely:
??? ???? ????????????? ???? ?????????????? ????? ????
originator companies, with a view to preserving an 
investor friendly climate where possible;97
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
health needs and avoid the appearance of impro-
priety, and that also ensure consumers actually 
obtain lower prices;98
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
avoided by those who beneﬁt from lower priced 
pharmaceuticals;99
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
imports of patented pharmaceuticals into devel-
oping countries;100 and
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
that discourage the use of modern medicines in 
those countries.101
While it is hard to quarrel with Professor Bird’s ﬁve-
pronged strategy, or the empirical evidence on which 
it rests, a degree of caution remains nonetheless in 
order.
Consultation and collaboration with originator 
pharmaceutical companies only become feasible when 
the latter are willing to negotiate. The patent-holding 
drug companies lack an incentive to negotiate so 
long as there are no clear legal sanctions with which 
to threaten them in case of refusals to deal. Negotia-
tions are likewise less likely if powerful governments, 
such as the United States, are prepared to retaliate 
with trade sanctions and other economic pressures 
(most of which are illegal under international law)102 
when developing countries actually utilize TRIPS 
ﬂexibilities. 
The climate for negotiations does seem more favor-
able now than it was in the recent past. But this 
greater willingness to negotiate is partly because the 
multilateral system has devised a set of legal tools that 
states can use to lower prices, beyond price controls, 
which though perfectly legal under TRIPS, are seldom 
employed by developing country governments. Profes-
sor Bird also recognizes that the new tools make pooled 
procurement strategies both feasible and desirable (as 
Fred Abbott and I have been at pains to show),103 and 
I shall return to this theme later on.
One must also be wary of criticizing governments 
for over-extending the range of their medical concerns, 
lest one fall into the trap of thinking that people in 
developing countries do not suffer from the same Type 
I diseases as those that burden developed countries. 
The opposite is true, as Professor Outterson points 
out,104 because studies show just how heavy the inci-
dence of such diseases, including heart disease, really 
is in many developing countries. The difference does 
not lie in the disease burden as such, but in the means 
available to cope with it. 
As Outterson demonstrates, for example, high pat-
ent prices charged for Type I diseases in developed 
countries are ameliorated by “private and social insur-
ance mechanisms, relatively high per capita incomes, 
and (in some cases) government monopsony procure-
ment;” whereas in low and middle income countries, 
“[p]atent-based pricing denies access to the majority 
of direct purchasers.”105 Hence, the Thai government 
issued a compulsory license on Plavix when the manu-
facturer allegedly refused to deal, on the grounds that 
people in Thailand suffer from heart disease just as 
they do in the United States.106 By the same token, one 
may ask why 90 percent of Egyptian males should be 
denied access to life-improving drugs, such as Viagra, 
so that exorbitant proﬁts can be extracted from the 
most affluent 10 percent in that country.107
Professor Bird rightly argues that efforts to reduce 
the prices of any medicines in the interest of public 
health must be accompanied by a scrupulous “clean 
hands” approach that ensures the drugs will actually 
be distributed at the lowest proﬁtable prices, with 
adequate compensation to the patentees. The level of 
compensation was questionable in the Thais’ treat-
ment of Plavix,108 the compulsory license on Viagra 
in Egypt was tainted by the appearance of impropri-
ety and self dealing,109 and complaints about “shadow 
pricing” in some Latin American countries merit seri-
ous attention.110
While all developing countries would beneﬁt from 
Professor Bird’s ﬁve-pronged strategy when consider-
ing the use of compulsory licenses on patented medi-
cines, his higher level concerns about negative impacts 
on foreign direct investment, about diminished incen-
tives to invest in innovation, and about the risks of 
retaliation all require a more nuanced response. 
Because the article by Kristina Lybecker and Elisabeth 
Fowler raises these same concerns more vigorously, I 
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prefer to address them below in connection with com-
ments on that study.
C. Views of the Hostile Sympathizers
In their contribution to this Symposium,111 Lybecker 
and Fowler express sympathy for compulsory licenses 
that are “invaluable when used to address healthcare 
emergencies or remove technological supply bottle-
necks” in developing countries.112 However, they devote 
most of their article to denigrating Thailand’s use of 
compulsory licenses, which they deem ill considered 
and illegitimate, while faintly praising Canada’s own 
admittedly contorted efforts to implement the Waiver 
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as at 
least maintaining a higher degree of legitimacy. In 
short, they are decidedly hostile to much current prac-
tice and the legal reasoning that supports it.
At the outset, the basis for comparing Thailand’s 
and Canada’s use of compulsory licenses is open to 
question. Thailand acted to obtain lower cost supplies 
of AIDS and cardiovascular medicines for its domestic 
markets. Canada used its compulsory license to meet 
Rwanda’s need for AIDS drugs under the Waiver.113 
In this scenario, Canada is at best a Good Samaritan 
manqué, whose actions have zero impact on the Cana-
dian market for the goods in question. Its authori-
ties remain free to allow Canada’s generic industry 
to assist Rwanda or not, at some or no proﬁt, as the 
participants deem ﬁt, without incurring any of the 
pressures and costs that would derive from a need 
to address Canada’s own public health problems. At 
most, one may observe that Canada’s action to assist 
Rwanda will perhaps adversely affect the patentee’s 
global market expectations for sales of its AIDS prod-
uct,114 and that this constitutes a common denomina-
tor underlying the two situations. All the same, Thai-
land’s concerns to meet its own public health needs 
by such means do not strike me as truly parallel with 
Canada’s concerns to be a Good Samaritan. One must 
accordingly remain wary of drawing conclusions from 
a comparison of these two scenarios, even if they were 
depicted in a factually accurate manner.
Unfortunately, the authors tend to accept the phar-
maceutical industries’ views of both the facts and the 
law as they pertain to Thailand, without sufficient 
attention to contrary evidence. For example, more 
peer-reviewed evidence would be advisable to claim 
that Thailand’s quality standards were so low that 
they endangered AIDS patients by exposing them to 
drug-resistant strains of the disease.115 Without such 
evidence, one is left to wonder if the drug resistance 
rates in Thailand were dissimilar from those in, say, 
Malawi, where FDA-approved drugs are available, or 
for that matter, in certain more developed countries, 
where resistance has been encountered despite the use 
of drugs meeting the highest quality standards.
The authors also question the sincerity of the Thai 
government’s stated goal of reducing the costs of drugs 
supplied under its public health program and thereby 
to promote universal access to essential medicines. 
Echoing spokesmen for the industry, this criticism 
stems from the claim that the government-owned 
producer turned a “proﬁt” on the products it distrib-
uted.116 Yet, as Abbott and Reichman reported, when 
the authorities issued a government use license for 
efavirenz, “Merck’s price was approximately double 
that of the Indian generic price,” although Merck later 
offered a price about 20 per cent above the Indian 
generic.117 The Thai government expected to reduce 
the price of Kaletra to about 20 per cent of Abbott 
Laboratories’ current price, and it hoped “to reduce its 
costs for clopidogrel (Plavix) by a factor of 10.”118 These 
products are all distributed “through publicly funded 
government organizations” (which aim to provide uni-
versal access to HIV-AIDS treatment in that country). 
Thailand’s soaring expenditures on public health “now 
constitute approximately 10% of the total government 
budget.”119 In this context, claims of “proﬁt” appear 
tendentious without proof that the funds in question 
did not beneﬁt the public health sector as a whole.
To their credit, Professors Lybecker and Fowler 
recognize some of the inﬁrmities in Canada’s Access 
to Medicines Regime (CAMR), which was enacted 
ostensibly to enable Canadian generic drug manufac-
turers to assist poor countries obtain medicines they 
could not manufacture, under authority of the Waiver 
to (and, eventually Amendment of ) article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. For example, they criticize “the 
layers of bureaucracy and technicalities” (not required 
by TRIPS) “that it takes to work through the legisla-
tion,”120 obstacles that took Apotex about three years 
to ship a modest supply of AIDS drugs to Rwanda and 
convinced the ﬁrm not to repeat the experience in the 
future.
Passed over in silence, however, is the fact that the 
Canadian Act limited would-be local suppliers of for-
eign needs to 57 drugs or vaccines, mostly concerning 
AIDS, and most of those already available in generic 
form. As Outterson elsewhere explains, “Almost all of 
the other drugs on the list are off-patent or face legal 
generic competition in a similar form.”121 The very 
narrow list of drugs available under the CAMR thus 
“operates as a disease-speciﬁc limitation on compul-
sory licensure under Paragraph 6” of the Doha Dec-
laration,122 even though that Declaration clearly sup-
ports the use of compulsory licensing “without regard 
to the type of disease.”123 In contrast, the European 
Union, spurred by vigorous Parliamentary oversight, 
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adopted a comprehensive implementing Regulation124 
that appears to successfully incorporate most of the 
ﬂexibilities available to WTO Members in making use 
of the Waiver Decision.125
Professors Lybecker and Fowler nonetheless praise 
the Canadian regime for its “legitimacy,” while cas-
tigating Thailand’s approach as a “controversial and 
possibly abusive Thai regime, both of which operate 
under the same WTO rules.”126 In their eyes, “CAMR 
can be viewed as a success in that safe, effective and 
less expensive medicines were eventually shipped to 
Rwanda,”127 whereas Thailand’s regime (apart from 
questions of product quality) appropriates patented 
products, such as Plavix, and is “more difficult to 
understand as the public health necessity the 
Thai government has described.” Therefore, 
Thailand’s “expansion of the compulsory licens-
ing program weakens the international health 
community’s consensus on the policy and could 
strip Article 31 of all future legitimacy.”128 In 
promoting “industrial policy” rather than access 
to medicines, they conclude, this regime violates 
both the letter and spirit of WTO law.129
These assertions reﬂect the inﬂuence of indus-
try propagandists, who relentlessly misinterpret 
the few TRIPS provisions that escaped their control 
while insisting on strict compliance with all the rest. 
In reality, there are no disease-speciﬁc restrictions 
under either Article 31 or the Doha Declaration and its 
implementing measures.130 Nor is there any require-
ment of a “national emergency” to justify recourse to a 
compulsory license. All that an emergency adds is the 
power of WTO Members to waive the duty to negotiate 
with the patentee under article 31(b),131 which applies 
under ordinary circumstances. For that matter, article 
31(b) also dispenses with the duty to negotiate with 
patentees in the event that the WTO Member issues a 
government use license, rather than a public-interest 
license open to the private sector,132 which is exactly 
the path that Thailand chose to follow.133 Indeed, a 
government use license is the route normally preferred 
by the pharmaceutical industry because it can avoid 
(and did avoid, according to Thai authorities) disrupt-
ing private-sector distribution channels not ﬁnanced 
by the government.134 
In short, the Thai approach was a perfectly “legiti-
mate” exercise of the State’s powers under the TRIPS 
Agreement, with a possible caveat for the low royalty 
paid the patentees (not mentioned by Lybecker and 
Fowler), which the Thai authorities claim was left 
open for negotiations that the patentees declined to 
undertake.135 No similar cloak of legitimacy can, how-
ever, be extended to the U.S. reprisals against Thai-
land which — as we shall see in a moment — appear 
directly in conﬂict with both the letter of WTO foun-
dational law and an actual decision against the U.S. by 
a duly constituted WTO tribunal.136
D. The Big Picture Items
Disregarding these legal inaccuracies, Lybecker and 
Fowler raise a number of policy issues that overlap 
to some extent with Professor Bird’s own evaluation. 
Here the major concerns that merit a fuller appre-
ciation are the potential loss of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) that compulsory licensing may engender; 
a corresponding reduction of incentives to invest in 
innovation; the need for cooperative rather than con-
frontational approaches to the public health problems 
at issue; and the risk of retaliation against develop-
ing countries that continue to implement these TRIPS 
ﬂexibilities. Let me end this Comment by brieﬂy con-
sidering these issues one by one.
1. potential poss of fdi and investment 
opportunities
Professors Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler all express con-
cerns that, when faced with the risk of compulsory 
licensing, pharmaceutical companies may vote with 
their feet. For example, patent-holding drug compa-
nies may cancel or reduce planned investments in the 
area,137 decline to bring new products to the country in 
question,138 or even withdraw from the territory alto-
gether, as was threatened in both South Africa139 and 
Thailand.140
In approaching this issue, let us ﬁrst note the evi-
dence showing that there is no clearly defined or 
established relation between the level of intellectual 
property protection a developing country provides and 
FDI. Some countries, such as China, attracted massive 
amounts of FDI, despite woefully inadequate intellec-
tual property protection, because the market oppor-
tunities and other conditions remained irresistible.141 
Other poor countries, with little to offer in the way 
of comparable economic opportunities, attract virtu-
ally no FDI despite patent laws that sometimes afford 
more protection than that of the United States.142
There is something intriguing about these 
threats to withhold new pharmaceutical 
products, or to withdraw from the 
territory, that merits deeper reﬂection.
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This said, there is something intriguing about these 
threats to withhold new pharmaceutical products, or to 
withdraw from the territory, that merits deeper reﬂec-
tion. Consider, for example, what might happen if sim-
ilar threats were carried out against Ruritania, whose 
government is assumed to possess legal expertise and 
a measure of political independence for present pur-
poses. First, the Ruritanian health authorities would 
immediately understand that all new pharmaceutical 
products not the subject of local patent applications 
had fallen into the public domain by deﬁnition.143 The 
authorities would thus remain free to reverse-engineer 
the relevant molecular entities in private laboratories 
or at their universities, as supplemented where nec-
essary by hiring outside technical experts in order to 
obtain the key active ingredients.144 
Once the molecule was successfully reverse-engi-
neered, the Health Ministry could tender bids to 
generic producers anywhere in the world — includ-
ing Brazil, India, and China — to establish plants 
in Ruritania for production of the drug in question. 
These producers could arguably supply both the local 
population and, as exporters of legitimate parallel 
drugs unfettered by patents, any country in the rest of 
the world that had adopted a policy of international 
exhaustion (which remains perfectly consistent with 
article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement). More importantly, 
Ruritania could also export these drugs to any other 
country that, lacking manufacturing capacity of its 
own, had issued a compulsory license for them under 
the Waiver machinery of the Doha Declaration.145
Of course, the market in Ruritania might afford insuf-
ﬁcient economies of scale to attract such investment, 
although that apparently was not the case in Egypt or 
Thailand, where disgruntled foreign pharmaceutical 
companies canceled similar investments.146 In that 
event, Ruritania, as a WTO Member without manu-
facturing capacity, could appeal to any other Member 
having that capacity for assistance under the Waiver to 
article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.147 Such an appeal 
would be administratively simpler to handle than was 
the case with Rwanda, because it would require only 
one compulsory license — in the exporting country — 
rather than back-to-back compulsory licenses in two 
countries, as the Waiver would normally entail.
Either way, a determined Ruritania appears likely to 
obtain the drugs, and possibly the capacity to compete 
with the originator company in third markets as well, 
while the originator company would lose its foothold 
in Ruritania and, perhaps, tarnish its image there and 
throughout the developing world. All this because the 
originator company had been unwilling to supply the 
drug at proﬁt-making prices that a large percentage 
of the population could afford instead of at monopoly 
prices that only the richest elite could afford.148 
At this point, the reader may well begin to ask who 
is threatening whom? Let us return to this question 
when we discuss the advantages of a cooperative, 
rather than a confrontational, approach below.149
2. reducing incentives to innovate
Most informed observers agree that investing in phar-
maceutical R&D is a very risky business, which is the 
principle justiﬁcation offered for strong pharmaceu-
tical patents. So Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler logically 
worry about lessening those incentives by exposing 
originator ﬁrms to the risk of compulsory licenses (i.e., 
ex post liability rules, in the form of a reasonable roy-
alty) in place of the ex ante exclusive rights they had 
initially planned to exploit.150
In reality, as Professor Outterson and others have 
demonstrated, investment in cures for Type I diseases 
are geared to developed country markets and not to 
potential returns from developing countries, at least 
at the present time. The value of markets for these 
drugs in most poor countries remains relatively so low 
— compared to conditions in, say, the U.S. and E.U. 
— that Outterson envisions a “buy out” scheme that 
would enable patent-free distribution in poor coun-
tries, side-by-side with monopoly pricing in OECD 
countries.151 In short, and under present-day condi-
tions, the issuance of compulsory licenses on Type I 
medications in poor countries would have virtually no 
impact on incentives to innovate in rich countries.152 
Over time, however, the emergence of major mid-
dle-income markets, such as those in India, China, and 
Brazil, could increasingly affect incentives to invest in 
such drugs by expanding the potential for long-term 
aggregate revenues.153 That prospect is another reason 
why big originator companies will likely invest in local 
production in those countries anyway, despite policies 
to ensure broader access to medicines that their gov-
ernments may pursue. One way forward is to permit 
the drug companies to retain the elite markets in these 
poor countries, and to focus access proposals on the 
public sectors. In Brazil, for example, branded AIDS 
drugs are sold to the privately insured, despite the fact 
that any Brazilian may receive them for free at pub-
lic clinics. The wealthy seldom frequent public clinics, 
and are willing to pay more for the branded drugs.
Professors Lybecker and Fowler express concerns 
about R&D pertaining to tropical, neglected, and 
other diseases prevalent in poor developing coun-
tries.154 There is virtually no investment in cures for 
such diseases by the major research-driven compa-
nies that compulsory licensing could discourage.155 
On the contrary, the hope for treating these diseases 
258 journal of law, medicine & ethics
SYMPOSIUM
rests on public-private collaborations, funded largely 
by donors, in which big pharmaceutical companies 
have laudably participated for humanitarian reasons, 
with mixed results thus far.156 This collaborative pro-
cess may beneﬁt from compulsory licensing machin-
ery when some particular patented component blocks 
collective action, rather than the other way around.157
In the future, one may imagine private research-
based pharmaceutical industries in certain developing 
countries turning their attention to tropical, neglected, 
and poverty-related diseases, in the hopes of ﬁnancial 
gain, and they may also seek to adapt cures for Type I 
and Type II diseases to developing world conditions. 
In that event, the use of compulsory licenses must be 
handled with care to ensure that incentives were main-
tained by means of a suitable correlation between risk 
and proﬁt. If and when that eventuality should mate-
rialize, one might also dare to hope that the very ﬁrm 
that had invested in such projects might be inclined 
to market the resulting medicines on a “high-volume, 
low proﬁt margin” basis, for the beneﬁt of both private 
and public interests, in which case compulsory licens-
ing would become superﬂuous.158
3. the advantages of collaborative action
Professors Bird, Lybecker, and Fowler rightly empha-
size the need for a more collaborative approach to the 
issues that surround compulsory licensing, and both 
articles point to the advantages of a pooled procure-
ment strategy, which Professor Abbott and I have 
recently explored in depth.159 Without delving deeply 
into this topic here, let me stress in passing that the 
legal machinery adopted under the aegis of the Doha 
Declaration serves to promote, rather than to hinder, 
this very sort of collaboration.
If a number of developing countries pooled their 
procurement needs by coordinating the potential use 
of compulsory licenses for selected medicines, they 
could generate economies of scale and scope to entice 
even the originator pharmaceutical companies to play 
ball with them, rather than against them. The carrot 
in such a scenario is the possibility for the origina-
tor company to exercise its exclusive rights, includ-
ing trademarks, over a suitably large area that would 
make it worth their while to collaborate even at dis-
counted prices. Ideally, incentives can be calibrated to 
provide still greater rewards to those originator com-
panies willing to invest in local production facilities 
serving the areas or countries that had coordinated 
their procurement needs.160 Local production, in turn, 
implants know-how into the local community, and it 
tends to stimulate both capacity for — and commer-
cial interest in — conducting research on diseases of 
local importance, with the possible use of indigenous 
resources.161
By the same token, originator companies unwilling 
to cooperate in a pooled procurement strategy would 
run the risk that the potential market for the drugs in 
question could be handed over to investors from other 
developing countries. If that occurred, it would pro-
vide the coordinating countries with many of the same 
advantages that would otherwise accrue from coop-
eration with the originator companies. In other words, 
pooled procurement strategies under the aegis of the 
Doha Declaration could produce a win-win situation 
for all concerned, in which the overall goal was that 
envisioned by Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo, namely, 
to make medicines available at prices most people in 
developing countries could afford, and not just a privi-
leged few.162
4. the risk of retaliatory action
Meanwhile, living as we do in a more confrontational 
climate, one must remain acutely aware of the risks 
that powerful governments may retaliate against 
developing countries that press their rights under the 
Doha Declaration by issuing compulsory licenses on 
patented medicines. Both Bird and Lybecker empha-
size these risks,163 with Thailand as a case in point. Not 
only did USTR place Thailand under the 2007 Special 
301 “Priority Watch List Surveillance,”164 it threatened 
to terminate Thailand’s Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) privileges to export certain products to 
the U.S. at low or no tariffs, in retaliation for its resort 
to the compulsory licenses in question.165
At the outset, it is well to acknowledge that we can-
not infuse public officials in developing countries with 
the courage to defend themselves if they are unwilling 
to do so. What can, and should be said, is that govern-
ments ought not to contemplate issuing compulsory 
licenses on patented pharmaceuticals unless they are 
prepared to stand up for their legal rights; and if they 
do stand up for those rights, then it is the retaliat-
ing state — not the victims — who will most likely be 
found to violate WTO rules. 
Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU) obliges Members to seek redress for 
alleged violations of the WTO Agreement, includ-
ing its TRIPS component, by means of specified 
multilateral venues and procedures.166 Under this 
provision, if the U.S. authorities believe that a devel-
oping country government has abusively issued a 
compulsory license, they may lawfully haul that 
country before a WTO dispute settlement panel 
and state their case, with a right of appeal to the 
WTO Appellate Body. What USTR cannot legally 
do is to unilaterally impose sanctions for the loss of 
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expected trade beneﬁts, as it appears to have done 
in the case of Thailand.167 In fact, there is already a 
WTO panel decision criticizing USTR for past use of 
Section 301 listings for TRIPS-related matters, and 
that decision expressly warned that sanctions would 
likely be authorized if such violations continued in the 
future.168
From a legal rather than a political-economic per-
spective, there is accordingly a greater risk that unilat-
eral retaliatory action will be held in violation of WTO 
law than that governments issuing compulsory licenses 
in conformity with the Doha Declaration will them-
selves incur sanctions under WTO rules. Moreover, if 
powerful states continue to engage in unilateral retali-
ations of this sort, they run still another set of legal 
risks that has thus far been underappreciated. Because 
such action constitutes a violation of the DSU and of 
the framework Agreement Establishing the WTO,169 it 
would entitle the aggrieved party to all the remedies 
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides for breach of the relevant agreements.170 A 
primary remedy thus provided is the age-old right of 
self-help implicit in the power of an aggrieved party to 
suspend its obligations under the treaty in question, 
pending compensation for breach.171 
In sum, if Occitania wrongfully retaliates against 
Ruritania for issuing a compulsory license, then Ruri-
tania may become entitled to suspend its obligations 
to protect patented pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS 
Agreement, with respect to Occitania, until the treaty 
violation was either purged or compensated. In that 
event, if Occitania sued Ruritania at the WTO for nul-
liﬁcation or impairment of beneﬁts under TRIPS,172 
the likely result would be a vindication of Ruritania’s 
counterclaim that Occitania’s unilateral retaliation 
had violated article 23.1 of the DSU and, thereby, jus-
tiﬁed Ruritania’s own self-help defensive action.
There is little reason to suppose that the new admin-
istration in Washington will change pre-existing intel-
lectual property policies, given that it continues to 
draw considerable support from those industries that 
obtained such policies from the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. Nevertheless, the new administra-
tion has expressed serious concern to promote the rule 
of law in international relations, unlike its immediate 
predecessor. If so, there is hope that it will take steps 
to avoid the dubious legal position and corresponding 
risk of sanctions to which unilateral retaliatory action 
necessarily exposes it.
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